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Post-implementation analysis: dependence and trust in VMI context 
Abstract 
Purpose - More than two decades long technological improvements in information sharing have not yet ensured a 
flawless execution of vendor managed inventory (VMI) and left interested parties wondering about the reasons of 
poor results. Although VMI is a collaborative tool, the relational factors in a VMI setting have not received enough 
attention due to challenges in obtaining relational buyer-supplier data in addition to extant focus on analytical 
approaches. In this paper, post-implementation relational factors are investigated in order to extract relevant insights. 
Design/methodology/approach - Accounting for the duration of the VMI relationship, we focus on two dimensions 
of VMI often ignored post-implementation: dependence of the buyer on the VMI-supplier and trust of the buyer in the 
VMI-supplier. Cross-sectional data were collected using a survey collected from distributors mostly in auto and 
electrical supply industries, which have their inventories managed by manufacturers through VMI arrangements. The 
sample was obtained from a leading third-party VMI-platform service provider that serves thousands of distributor- 
manufacturer locations with billions of dollars in sales orders. Multiple Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) regression has 
been used to test the hypotheses. 
Findings - This paper provides empirical support that in the post-implementation stage, longer VMI relationships are 
associated with higher distributor dependence on the manufacturer. In addition, too much dependence could actually 
hurt the distributor’s trust in the manufacturer. 
Practical implications - We propose that distributors maintain some of the purchasing and inventory management 
skills in house to limit their dependencies on the manufacturers. Manufacturers should also invest in trust-building 
activities, such as regular communications with distributors. 
Originality/value - This is the first study providing empirical evidence on the (i) positive association between length 
of VMI relationship and buyer dependence on the supplier, and (ii) curvilinear dependence–trust link in a post-
implementation VMI context. 
Keywords Vendor managed inventory, VMI, Dependence, Trust, Collaborative relationships 
Paper type Research 
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Introduction 
Adoption of vendor managed inventory (VMI) has steadily been on the rise in buyer-supplier 
relationships (Radzuan et al., 2015) and according to a survey conducted among executives where 
73 percent of respondents were from Fortune 1000 companies, the VMI adoption rate reached 70 
percent (E2open, 2015). E2open study also reports that while “the visibility into time-sensitive 
data continues to be a struggle”, “there is a sustained demand for better inventory management 
collaboration” perhaps because the same study reports that 31 percent of the executives report 
below-average levels of VMI collaboration with their trading partners. 
Recent studies provide comprehensive reviews of the extant VMI-related literature 
(Govindan, 2013; Akhbari et al., 2014) that explicate the benefits and how supply chain partners 
need to adjust the parameters within a VMI setting in order to ensure a successful relationship. 
While the literature classify and examine various VMI dimensions (Hong et al., 2016; Radzuan et 
al., 2015; Torres et al., 2014;  Dong et al., 2014), a few incorporate trust as an influential factor 
and yet none look into the VMI relationship from a dependence perspective. This study 
investigates the dependence of the buyer on the supplier in a VMI relation with respect to trust that 
has to exist in a collaborative relationship between the upstream and downstream supply chain 
members (Ozer et al., 2011; Ayadi et al., 2013). Kauremaa et al. (2009) propose relationship 
patterns of VMI as basic, cooperative, and synchronized, suggesting that these layers depend on 
“dyadic intentions and contextual factors surrounding the given implementation.” Whether 
directed toward further collaboration or designed more as a transactional relationship, buyer-
supplier relations may evolve over time based on many factors. Yu et al. (2009) acknowledge the 
relational nature of the VMI and analyze it via evolutionary game theories by assuming the buyer 
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as the dominant partner and leader of the supply chain. We consider a VMI situation under which 
neither the buying nor the selling company dominates the relationship. 
Our decision scenario is inspired by the credible contracting branch that is explicated in 
the simple contracting schema proposed by Williamson (2002). Williamson suggests that incentive 
alignment plays a key role in establishing a credible contract between the buyer and the seller 
under private ordering situations in absence of a strict hierarchy (Williamson, 2002). In application 
of this scheme to a VMI context, two main components to VMI, information sharing and decision 
transfer (Dong et al., 2014), could be favoring the supplier due to increased dependence of the 
buyer on the supplier. However, the idea of aligning the incentives suggest that not only the VMI 
relation has to initiate from the state of an incentive equilibrium but also the equilibrium ought to 
be maintained throughout the course of the VMI relationship. In a collaborative setting such as 
VMI, it is demonstrated that while the network costs may be reduced, the realized benefits must 
be fairly distributed (Lehoux et al., 2011) which is often not the case (Yao et al., 2007). Therefore, 
it is possible that if there is an imbalance in the incentive structure (i.e. through a disturbance or 
perturbation of the incentive alignment) then either one or both of the parties in a buyer-supplier 
relationship may develop perceptions of contract violations (Özpolat and Dresner, 2018). 
Since interdependencies between the firms vary in different settings, a VMI program 
should also be evaluated in light of relational factors which might extend the reach of the recent 
VMI frameworks proposed by scholars. In this empirical study, we examine the VMI program as 
a collaborative supply chain relationship from the buyer’s dependence perspective. Using survey 
data collected from distributor-manufacturer relationships, we provide empirical evidence that 
longer VMI relationships are associated with higher distributor dependence on the manufacturer. 
While a moderate level of dependence is natural in collaborative VMI relationships, this paper also 
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reveals that too much dependence could actually hurt the distributor trust in the manufacturer. Our 
findings contribute towards better understanding the mechanics of relational factors within the 
VMI relationship after the roll-out of the program. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the VMI method and 
relational factors. Section three evaluates the concept of dependence under a VMI setting. Section 
four describes the survey study that follows with results that yield from data analysis under section 
five. Section six presents the discussion of the results and concluding remarks along with 
limitations of the study. Further research suggestions are presented under section seven. 
 
Literature review 
VMI was initiated as a promising collaborative approach to managing inventories of the buyer by 
its supplier (Waller et al., 1999; Yu et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2016). To date, extant 
literature includes several studies related to the factors that affect the successful implementation 
of VMI. For instance, Yang et al. (2003) and Disney and Towill (2003) demonstrated VMI’s 
effectiveness at mitigating the bullwhip effect and proposed a set of guidelines to aid managers for 
VMI implementation which includes the consideration of demand variability, inventory review 
interval, number of downstream firms, information availability and upstream firm’s flexibility. In 
order to identify the operational and strategic benefits of VMI and how these benefits are split 
between the upstream and downstream firms, Kauremaa et al. (2009) search and propose VMI 
implementations under three patterns, basic, cooperative, and synchronized. Reitner et al. (2012) 
developed a business process integration framework for the downstream firm to help firms act 
upon estimating the effects of VMI. Finally, Niranhan et al. (2011) describes how industry has  
created a practical approach which  lists the preconditions for implementation of VMI under three 
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headings; downstream firm (with stable growth, high transaction costs, good information and 
communication system, willingness to share information, and purchasing should not be a core 
competency), product (standardized, repeating, standard identification, low demand variance and 
demand is forecasted and stock levels are monitored), and upstream firm (supply chain trust/long-
term relationships, advantages evident to both supplier and customer, key suppliers constitute a 
high percentage of purchase orders, suppliers are willing to cooperate, integrated information 
system) (Niranjan et al., 2011). 
In these studies, however, the focus doesn’t extend beyond the implementation stage. The 
exceptions are the studies by Yu et al. (2009) and Yao et al. (2012). Yu et al. (2009) explore VMI 
from a game theoretical perspective while Yao et al. (2012) investigate supply chain learning. 
Once VMI is implemented, the impact of VMI on relational factors between the downstream and 
upstream partners is still relatively unexplored. Specifically, the role of dependence is relatively 
under-explored in buyer-supplier relations research (Jean et al., 2012). Indisputably, ensuring a 
healthy implementation is targeted by scholars and industry professionals (Elvander et al., 2007; 
Govindan 2013); however, attention to post-implementation of VMI is of extreme value as 
suggested by extant research (Waller et al., 1999; Barratt and Oliveira, 2001; Dolci and Macada, 
2014). This is due to investments required by the supply chain partners during implementation 
(Mishra, 2014) as well as the linkages between relational factors (i.e. interdependence, mutual 
trust, etc.) Supportively, it is suggested that “the actual research work lacks the roll-out 
sustainability of VMI, the step that will lead the new implementation towards expected benefits” 
(Govindan, 2013, p.3829). As such, this research model depicts the relationship between VMI and 
relational factors including dependence and trust. 
 
6 
 
VMI as a collaborative method 
Perona and Saccani (2004) classify the integration techniques in buyer supplier relationships and 
define a continuum where both VMI and CPFR need high relational commitment. Whipple and 
Russell (2007) examine the characteristics, requirements, benefits, and barriers to various 
collaborative relationships, propose a typology of collaborative approaches. Their typology 
includes three types and classify VMI as a Type I collaborative approach under the definition of 
collaborative transaction management which doesn’t need as much social capital to run. 
Meanwhile, similar to Barratt (2004b), Whipple and Russell (2007) limit the expected “sustainable 
pay-off” for VMI under Type I relationships. 
Achieving sustainable profits with the idea of creating sustainable competitive advantage 
by pursuing and establishing strategic collaborative relationships is very much in line with the 
rarity of CPFR relations. The exploratory study conducted by Whipple and Russell (2007) propose 
that the number of firms involved in Type I collaborative relationship, where they positioned the 
VMI, is greater than the other two levels (i.e. initial CPFR, event collaboration under Type II; 
advanced CPFR under Type III) whereas only a few firms operate under Type III level which 
requires more relational investment. By no means does the typology assert that relational 
investment is negligible for the VMI relations. Claassen et al. (2008) present in their findings that 
“buyer-perceived VMI success is impacted by the quality of the buyer-supplier relationship” 
among other tangible factors. 
Angulo et al. (2004) summarize the potential benefits of a VMI relation based on the extant 
literature and most of these benefits can easily be realized in short term (Whipple and Russell, 
2007) except the reduced costs through better utilization of the resources for production and 
transportation. This benefit requires the supplier to utilize the information received from the buyer 
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via EDI and actually use it in production planning. According to Claassen et al. (2008), their results 
show that most VMI implementations fall short of realizing this benefit by the supplier not being 
able to fully control the pipeline. In turn, they adopt the term vendor managed replenishment 
(VMR) (e.g. Holweg et al., 2005) for implementations that are not integrated with the production. 
It is evident that in a VMI relationship, the supplier has both, more responsibilities and realizable 
benefits. On the other hand, Dong et al. (2013) find in their empirical study that following the VMI 
implementation, downstream firm’s inventory is reduced; however, this inventory reduction may 
erode over time. Therefore, the “features that affect an organization’s readiness for VMI” 
(Niranjan et al., 2011) need to be kept up to date following the initial implementation. If the 
expectations of the collaborating firms do not align in a VMI relation, VMI collaboration may 
create asymmetrical dependencies. In other words, the diminishing realizable benefits over the 
course of VMI relation may contribute to creation of dependence/power imbalance. Next, we 
discuss dependence in a VMI relation, which remains unexplored. 
 
Dependence 
Scholars investigated the role of dependence within inter-personal as well as inter-firm 
relationships in previous studies (Wells and Kipnis, 2001; Corsten and Felde, 2004). Andaleeb 
(1995) analyzes dependence, trust and control in manufacturer-distributor setting. In his study, he 
asserts that two important factors create perception of dependence: (1) The importance/criticality 
of the resources provided by the source firm, (2) The number of alternative sources available to 
the target firm. Thru criticality and lack of alternatives, dependence will lead to cooperation, trust 
will generate bonding forces and enhance cooperation and trust will minimize controls. Andaleeb 
(1995) also found that dependence is not related with controls and trust will minimize the strong 
influence stance. Hart and Saunders (1997) explore the relationships between EDI, power and trust 
8 
 
within the context of buyer-seller dyad and study a case of EDI implementation in an innovative 
retail firm. In addition to revealing that coercive power deteriorates trust and persuasive power 
enhances trust, Hart and Saunders (1997) find that if the relative dependence is high, then the 
power of the resource-rich firm is higher to influence resource-dependent firms. 
Studying the inter-organizational governance in marketing channels, Heide (1994) showed that 
while symmetric dependence promoted bilateral governance, unilateral dependence had negative 
effects. Specifically, for better interaction between the firms, both firms must be locked into the 
relationship, otherwise unilateral dependence would undermine bilateral governance. These results 
are similar to what Emerson (1962) had suggested when he analyzed power-dependence relations. 
According to Emerson (1962), power of party A(B) over party B(A) was linked to the dependence 
of party B(A) to party A(B). Under balanced or equilibrium situations, dependence levels would 
be equal which would lead to powers being equal. This resembles a collaborative relationship 
where both parties depend on each other equally and there is a power balance or equilibrium. 
However, in an unbalanced situation where there is dependence imbalance (dependence of A on 
B is not equal to dependence of B on A), Emerson (1962) suggests that there will also be power 
imbalance and the collaboration between the parties will suffer and the balance will be sought in 
the power equation. Eventually balancing operations will occur one of three ways: (i) Withdrawal 
of the less powerful (more dependent) party, or (ii) coalition of the less powerful parties, or (iii) 
the action of status upgrade (give more power) by the more powerful to the less powerful. 
Similarly, Frazier (1999) discusses the high and symmetric interdependence between firms in a 
dyadic channel relationship. He suggests that in a low interdependence situation, the amount of 
attention and support between the firms is also low. He highlights that for further and/or stronger 
collaboration between firms, power should not be evaluated as a negative phenomenon but instead 
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high joint power should be nurtured. On the other hand, Ireland and Webb (2007) conclude that 
high levels of trust and power are not necessary in all relationships and they suggest that firms 
should appropriately balance trust and power. 
 
Dependence in distributor manufacturer VMI setting 
In a distributor-manufacturer VMI setting, it is expected that lack of joint decision making will 
cause the distributor to rely on manufacturer’s actions. Moreover, because the distributor will 
eventually lose its expertise of placing orders and inventory management, dependence will most 
likely increase. 
Dong et al. (2014) point to the decision transfer from the buyer to seller as VMI’s 
difference from other information sharing collaborative supply chain programs. Their study splits 
the VMI program into two components, namely, information sharing and decision transfer and 
focuses on the benefits of decision transfer. Considering the findings of Dong et al. (2014) in 
conjunction with that of Ketchen and Hult (2007) provide further understanding the relational 
dynamics of VMI: (i) The initiation of a VMI relationship can be explained by the resource 
dependence theory and VMI is a collaborative supply chain method, (ii) Once the VMI program 
is initiated, the focus should be to invest in social capital between the buyer and the seller. Shared 
goals, values and experiences of the VMI program should constantly be emphasized and these 
goals, values and experiences should be updated based on the needs of the firms. 
In VMI, distributors depend on manufacturers to make decisions that are mutually 
beneficial based on information shared. Until improvements and subsequent benefits in inventory 
management are fully realized, the distributors continue to share information unilaterally within a 
VMI relation, which suggests that dependence of the distributor on the manufacturer will increase. 
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Also considering loss of distributors’ inventory management and ordering skills, we hypothesize 
that: 
H1: Longer VMI relationships are associated with higher distributor dependence on the 
manufacturer. 
 
Next, we develop our second hypothesis on the relationship between dependence and trust. Trust 
plays a key role in buyer-supplier relationships. Liker and Choi (2004) report an American 
supplier’s dissatisfaction with Ford, GM and Chrysler as follows: “The Big Three [U.S. 
automakers] set annual cost-reduction targets [for the parts they purchase]. To realize those targets, 
they'll do anything. They've unleashed a reign of terror, and it gets worse every year. You can't 
trust anyone in those companies.” Hence it is not surprising that US auto makers have consistently 
ranked below Toyota and Honda in many measures including reliability, trustworthiness and 
profitability.  In a VMI context, the role of trust is critical both at the start and for the continuity 
of the relationship. The upstream and downstream firms enter into a VMI program in order to 
reduce the transaction costs and improve inventory performance. However, at the same time, due 
to some initial investment on EDI systems, there has to be a certain level of trust during the 
inception of the VMI program. It takes about two years for VMI to fully start working (Mishra, 
2014) and during this time, VMI program is improved through social exchanges. These social 
exchanges increase downstream firm’s trust in the upstream firm along with the increased 
dependency. 
Once VMI program is fully established and the inventory replenishment is integrated into 
the manufacturer’s production schedule, it is assumed that there will be fewer issues with the 
replenishment. However, this will reduce the communication between the firms to even lower 
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levels. Bunduchi (2007, pp.619-table 2) suggests that “online content and commerce 
functionalities reduce personal trust by replacing face to face communication and personal trust”. 
In essence, VMI program may not sustain business relationships with minimal amounts or in 
absence of personal interaction between the employees. Furthermore, since the manufacturer is the 
sole decision maker and acting as the distributor’s agent, lack of communication at advanced stages 
of a VMI program may cause agents acting for their own interest and perhaps putting the 
principal’s interest on the back seat. In their study, Villena et al. (2011) found that “either too little 
or too much social capital can hurt performance.” This study confirms that building social capital 
in a collaborative buyer supplier relationship positively affects buyer performance, but that if taken 
to an extreme, it can reduce the buyer’s ability to be objective and make effective decisions as well 
as increase the supplier’s opportunistic behavior.” 
Foreseeing this reliance, the manufacturer should be trustworthy enough for the distributor 
and then the distributor would have to have trust to the manufacturer. Once the VMI relation is 
well under way and the initial low-hanging performance improvements have been achieved, any 
problems that may have an effect on performance of distributor will be interpreted as violation 
against the VMI collaboration. These violations will pave the way to erosion of trust over time. 
Building on our first hypothesis, high levels of dependence is not desired unless balanced 
with trust and long VMI relationships could increase the likelihood of an adversely impactful 
imbalance due to higher levels of dependence. Based on preliminary research, exaggerated 
resource dependence is found to have an adverse effect on trust (Brinkhoff et al., 2015) and trust 
is best nurtured in mutual dependency conditions (Emerson, 1962). However, unlike Brinkhoff et 
al. (2015), we contend that VMI relationship should be evaluated similar to the approach in the 
evolutionary game theory (Torres et al., 2014) because the relational factors (i.e. dependence and 
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trust) evolve as the VMI initiative matures over time. In other words, as long as dependence and 
trust levels are nurtured and balanced appropriately through social exchanges, moderate levels of 
dependence may be sustainable. Therefore, distributor dependence on the manufacturer should 
exist for VMI commitment; however, possessing too much dependence during critical decision 
making moments may increase the likelihood of considerably deteriorating trust due to power 
imbalance, which can be hypothesized as: 
H2: There is an inverted curvilinear (inverse-U) relationship between a distributor’s 
dependence on the manufacturer and trust in the manufacturer 
 
Methodology 
In this empirical research, the unit of analysis is the distributor-manufacturer VMI relationship. 
Within this relationship, the distributors share the item-level point-of-sales data as well as the 
inventory levels with their manufacturers thru EDI (electronic data interchange). In turn, the 
manufacturers manage and replenish the inventories at the distributors (no consignment). Our 
survey study explores the multiple buyer and multiple supplier setting. 
A third party VMI service provider, that focuses on auto parts, electrical supplies, 
consumer goods and plumbing products, was contacted in order to reach out to the survey 
respondents at the distributors. This electronic data interchange (EDI) provider connects the 
systems of thousands of manufacturers, distributors and retailers and enables information sharing 
among them for millions of SKUs under which the operations amount to billions of dollars in sales 
orders. Utilizing a survey study on 200 distributors where the inventories are managed by the 
manufacturers under a VMI setting, the cross-sectional data were collected from the respondents 
who were, per Kumar et al. (1993) recommendation, senior level positions supervising the daily 
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VMI relationships. The response rate of the survey was 33.3 percent. While all of the distributors 
were from North America, all but four percent from Canada were located in U.S. These distributors 
were all independent entities that owned the inventories at their facilities. Following the common 
approach that asks participants to refer to a major or significant supply chain partner in answering 
survey questions (Hill et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2012), the respondents were asked to answer survey 
questions by referencing their largest VMI relation if they had multiple VMI relations.  
The EDI 852 (Product Activity Data document) accommodation that is provided by the 
third party VMI service provider enables the distributors to share item-level point-of-sales data 
and inventory levels daily with their manufacturers. The manufacturers make replenishment 
decisions based on these data. The accommodation by the service provider is limited at the 
technical level and doesn’t extend into making inventory level or order decisions. However, the 
service provider not only ensures that the flawless communication between the partners but also 
promotes the sharing of best practices by arranging annual conferences. 
The draft of survey was reviewed for content, clarity, flow and coherence by three logistics 
and supply chain researchers. Additionally two industry professionals pre-tested and enhanced the 
survey. The final survey had 32 question which is fewer than the suggested threshold by Dillman 
(1978) for a good response rate. Following a pre-notification e-mail a week ahead, the link to 
online survey was e-mailed to the contacts at each distributor with a couple of reminders for two 
consecutive Tuesdays in the late mornings which are believed to be less busy times in general than 
other days. To encourage interest in the survey, $2 donation was offered to be made to National 
Wildlife Federation on behalf of each respondent if they completed the survey. At the end, there 
were 38 responses in the first, 17 responses in the second and 2 responses in the third batch after 
each of the three reminders. 
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In the survey, besides respondent’s position in the distributor, their length of employment 
with the firm was also questioned which revealed that only three percent of the respondents had 
held their positions for less than a year. This provided a source of confidence in our survey in terms 
of levels of competency and knowledge of the respondents to effectively complete the survey. On 
the other hand, profiles of the distributors revealed that the distributors vary in size and come from 
electrical supplies, auto parts, plumbing supplies, and consumer goods industries. 
We contacted 200 distributors and managed to reach 162 of them, where 29 email addresses 
bounced back, 5 opted out of survey and 4 mentioned that they no more used VMI. The 57 survey 
responses out of 162 distributors contained three responses that were deemed incomplete and 
therefore omitted from the study resulting in 54 usable responses which yielded a 33.3 percent 
response rate. Testing for non-response bias, we compared the early and late responses per 
Armsrong and Overton (1977) by considering the late responses as a proxy for non-responses, and 
observed that the differences between early and late responses for key variables (i.e. trust, 
dependence, length of VMI) were not significant. Common method bias was also controlled to 
ensure the validity of the survey. Designing the survey, propensity-to-trust variable was included 
to control for potential respondent bias per Podsakoff et al. (2003, p.889). Additionally, reverse-
coded questions were included in some of the components to minimize response pattern biases. 
Following Kaiser’s eigenvalue greater-than-one criterion, the items and the components were 
double checked via factor analysis methods to confirm the reliability of underlying dimensions 
and verified that explained variance by the components is more than 50 percent.  
 
Items and components 
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The survey questions, each corresponding to an item for an underlying dimension, were adopted 
from prior studies but have been modified with the feedback received from research colleagues 
and industry professionals to fit into the VMI setting. Most of the questions utilized a five-point 
Likert scale while there were also forced-choice questions inquiring a yes/no answer (see Table 
IV in Appendix). 
The primary dependent variable, dependence, represented distributor’s dependence on its 
largest VMI manufacturer. As a latent variable, dependence was composed of four ordinal 
measurement items via the following questions: Approximately what percent of your purchases 
($ value) is from this supplier? Replenishment of what percent of the products you purchase from 
this supplier is done through VMI? Is this supplier important to our firm? Approximately how 
many other suppliers are available in the supply market for the product(s) you purchase from this 
supplier? Observing the dependence levels for different lengths of VMI relationship, the VMI 
relations that are less than 2 years have a mean dependence level of 3.03 while those that are longer 
than 6 years have a mean dependence of 3.43. 
The other focal dependent variable, trust, encompassed the distributor’s trust in its largest 
VMI manufacturer. Three dimensions of this latent trust variable (benevolence, integrity and 
ability) were measured with ordinal item scales for each dimension based on prior literature (Mayer 
et al., 1995). 
Length of VMI relationship was a key independent variable where the length was simply 
requested from the respondent in years as an ordinal unit of measure. The control variables 
included the latent “propensity to trust” variable, length of business relationship with the subject 
manufacturer, size of the distributor, performance measured as ordinal variables and the binary 
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dummy variables for the auto and electrical industries with other industries referenced as the base. 
The industry frequency and distributor size data are presented in Table Ia and Table Ib respectively. 
============================================================= 
------------------------INSERT TABLES Ia and Ib APPROXIMATELY HERE------------------------ 
============================================================= 
Table IIa provide descriptive statistics for the above variables. Evaluating these statistics 
along with the scatterplots, no major concerns are observed with respect to normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity assumptions. Additionally, the correlations between the variables were 
investigated for potential multicollinearity as presented in Table IIb. All values were below 0.7 
and the highest correlation was between ptt and trust which was expected as ptt was included to 
control for the potential respondent bias. We also stepwise dropped the moderately correlated 
variables and re-ran the regressions; which did not result in any significant change in coefficients 
magnitude or significance. 
============================================================= 
-------------------------INSERT TABLES IIa and IIb APPROXIMATELY HERE------------ 
============================================================= 
 
Analysis and results 
In this study, ordinary least squares regression is employed. There are 3 models; one for first 
hypothesis and two for the second hypothesis where the models are constructed as follows: 
H1 Model 1: 
Dependence = α + β1 Length of VMI relationship + β2 Size + β3,4 Industry dummies + β5 Industry 
VMI use + β6 Performance + ε 
H2 Model 2: 
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Trust = α + β1 Length of business relationship + β2 Size + β3 Dependence + β4 Propensity to trust 
+ β5,6 Industry dummies + β7 Industry VMI use + β8 Performance + ε 
H2 Model 3: 
Trust = α + β1 Length of business relationship + β2 Size + β3 Dependence + β4 Dependence2 + β5 
Propensity to trust + β6,7 Industry dummies + β8 Industry VMI use + β9 Performance + ε 
 
The results of the OLS regression are presented on Table III below. In Model 1, the 
dependent variable “Dependence” is regressed on length of VMI along where control variables of 
industry VMI use, performance, size of distributor, auto and electrical industry dummies were 
employed. The micro-level results revealed that length of VMI as a significant predictor of 
dependence levels with the coefficient of 0.17*. Industry VMI use and performance variables were 
also significant. 
============================================================= 
-------------------------INSERT TABLE III APPROXIMATELY HERE-------------------------- 
============================================================= 
The first model explained about 31 percent of the variance in dependence. This provided 
support for the first hypothesis that longer VMI relationships are associated with higher distributor 
dependence on the manufacturer (see Figure Ia). Based on this, for a distributor with a mean 
dependence level of 3.26 (un-normalized = 3.26*4 = 13.04), ceteris paribus, a year increase in the 
length of VMI relationship results in a 1.30 percent (0.17/13.04) increase in distributor’s 
dependence on its VMI manufacturer. 
The second and third models were developed for the second hypothesis where the dependent 
variable was set as “trust” along with the primary independent variable, “dependence”. In the 
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third model, the quadratic square term for dependence was added to the second model in an 
effort to search for an inverse U relationship between trust and dependence levels of the 
distributor for its manufacturer. In the second model, in absence of the square dependence term, 
the length of business relation (-0.41**) and the propensity to trust (0.67***) were significant 
while the linear dependence variable was not significant. Explained variance for this model was 
33 percent. The third model did not result in much of a change in the coefficients of the control 
variables. In an effort to search for both, improving the model and establishing an inverse U 
relation between trust and dependence, the square term for dependence was added where it was 
observed to be significant with a negative sign (-0.11*). While the square term was significant, it 
also resulted in revealing the linear term as positive and significant (2.85*). These two values 
established a curvilinear relation that is reminiscent of an inverse U relation, which is 
represented in below graph (with un-normalized values) and the values shown to be within the 
range of survey data (see Figure Ib). Finally, the third model revealed added improvement to the 
overall fit with an explained variance of 38 percent. 
============================================================= 
-------------------------INSERT FIGURE Ia & b APPROXIMATELY HERE-------------- 
============================================================= 
 
Discussion 
Utilizing survey data collected from distributors that have their inventories managed by 
manufacturers through VMI arrangements, we provide empirical evidence that longer VMI 
relationships are associated with increased distributor dependence on the manufacturer. Moreover, 
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we identify an inverted U shape relationship between distributors’ dependence on the 
manufacturers and distributors’ trust in the manufacturers. 
We make two contributions to the academic literature. This is the first paper empirically 
demonstrating that use of VMI creates dependencies on the distributor (buyer). As the 
manufacturer (supplier) takes over the replenishment process, the distributor loses critical 
purchasing and inventory management skills which increases dependency on the supplier. The 
increased levels of dependence could be exacerbated by lack of much needed in-house skills for 
analysis of VMI performance, as well as ensuring competitive contracting on future projects. 
Aligned with Heide (1994) findings that unilateral dependence has negative effects on bilateral 
governance, our findings establish a link between over-dependence on manufacturers and lower 
trust levels. While increased unilateral dependence may not necessarily cause direct harm to the 
relationship, we find that it could pose negative implications on other relational factors - such as 
trust. Hence our second contribution is to the organizational literature providing empirical 
evidence on the curvilinear dependence-trust link in collaborative supply chain relationships. 
Previously, Villena et al. (2011) showed that in buyer-supplier relationships, too much social 
capital generated by highly collaborative relationships, could decrease a buyer’s objectivity and 
increase a supplier’s opportunistic behavior – thus hurting supply chain performance. We extend 
their findings such that highly collaborative relationships could have inter-organizational trust 
problems caused by over-dependency as the relationship matures. 
This study also offers a few managerial implications. As distributor’s trust on the 
manufacturer will erode beyond certain levels of dependence of distributor on the manufacturer, 
we suggest that distributors keep some purchasing and inventory management expertise in house 
to prevent over-dependence and also allow them an optional exit. Joint decision making is rare in 
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VMI relationships and realizable benefits are limited relative to more advanced CPFR relations 
(Whipple and Russell, 2007). Distributors depend on manufacturers to make decisions that are 
beneficial for both parties based on the information that is shared electronically. VMI partners 
experience changes and witness improvements until all issues are resolved and VMI benefits are 
fully realized. In other words, once the easily achievable benefits are realized by both parties, the 
manufacturer’s motive might concentrate more on maintaining the integrated production planning 
while the distributor stops seeing further improvements. A possible reason could be that the 
manufacturer may not be able to accommodate its downstream VMI partner on the replenishment 
priority list. This behavior is reminiscent of the opportunistic approach of the firm with the 
transaction cost economics mindset. Perhaps not intentionally, but eventually, when the 
manufacturer focuses on its own benefits in absence of the additional distributor benefits (which 
are limited in VMI), the VMI relationship seems to dislodge from the initial collaboration 
commitment. The main reason for this is the underlying concept of allowing the manufacturer to 
take over the management of the distributor’s inventory. Lack of control might also instill the sense 
of uncertainty and then increased perception of dependence. More importantly, as the distributor’s 
additional benefits stagnate, further collaboration halts. 
Michalski et al. (2013) focus on the notion of asymmetries changing the behaviors of 
participants in collaborative arrangements in supply chain management and find that asymmetry 
influences various relationships disparately through its multi-faceted presence. Along with upward 
trends in volumes of replenishment, reduction in the number of alternative suppliers, and increase 
in criticality of the particular supplies, VMI programs increase dependence levels. Unless proper 
social capital investments are made, it is expected that trust towards the supplier will also suffer. 
In their study, where the upstream firm is dependent to the downstream firm, Yu et al. (2009) 
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employed a game theoretical model and found that in early stages of a VMI implementation, 
upstream firm has fewer benefits than the downstream firm and may even experience profit loss 
trying to maintain the relation but eventually, increase in transaction quantity between the firms 
result in increased profits for both parties. This ought to be considered because due to its limited 
nature, VMI partners may not expect further benefits in the horizon. Ultimately, unbalanced 
resource dependence is created when the distributor is left vulnerable to manufacturer’s actions. 
Furthermore, dependence imbalance could hurt the outcomes of the VMI relationship which may 
alternatively be interpreted as deterioration of trust (Brinkoff et al., 2014). Essentially, the buyer-
supplier relation will evolve toward either a traditional supply chain or VMI supply chain (Yu et 
al., 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
Handfield (2013) recommends manufacturers to be careful in launching VMI relationships, 
“Contrary to what many people think, companies like Toyota and Honda have moved away from 
VMI and simply chose to co-locate suppliers as close as possible to their facilities.” Although 
literature points to multiple VMI failures, the world’s largest cloud based VMI service provider 
Datalliance recently reported more than twenty years of consecutive growth (Nasdaq, 2017).  
E2open, a cloud based supply chain software company, is pursuing further opportunities based on 
the survey results demonstrating only 33 percent of the executives feel that inventory levels reflect 
optimized cost and service levels (E2open, 2015). While still believing in the potential of VMI, 
we propose that post-implementation stage merits more attention to dependence and trust. Since it 
is possible that the unilateral dependence may create power imbalance and hurt the relationship 
through eroding trust, the distributors should limit dependence levels on their manufacturers to 
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certain upper boundaries before the rollout of the VMI relation. Once under way, the expectations 
from VMI collaborations should be adjusted accordingly and sufficient relational investments 
ought to be allocated for advancing the collaboration beyond VMI. Other considerations can be 
listed but not limited to working on back-up plans such as dual sourcing, and also evaluating the 
efficacy of keeping certain critical purchasing and inventory skills in-house in lieu of targeting 
extended cost savings.  
The above study’s primary limitation is the sample size which might explain the small 
effect size in the analysis. On the other hand, limited scope of the industries may also have an 
impact on the generalizability of the findings. In relation to scope of industries, the manufacturer 
vs. distributor context adds another constraint. Retailer vs. distributor and manufacturer vs. raw 
materials supplier settings reside as potential avenues for explore. While single VMI service 
provider may have caused reduction in the survey response pool, we are also aware that excluding 
those VMI relations that may have failed earlier could introduce relationship survival bias and its 
effects would be unknown. The findings do not infer causality due to the nature of the cross-
sectional data. Additionally, this study only assesses the relational variables from the distributor. 
Knowing that the relational factors such as dependence and trust are mutual, a follow-up study 
could be conducted by including the survey data for corresponding manufacturers. Single in depth 
case study of a VMI relation could reveal many detailed insights and multiple case studies within 
and across industries as well as buyer-supplier contexts would be highly beneficial in developing 
the theory in VMI relations. In an ideal setting, longitudinal studies that capture both sides of the 
VMI relationships would be most helpful in observing the dependence-trust link over time. 
 
Appendix 
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Table Ia. Industry frequency in sample 
 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Electrical  26 48 
Auto 19 35 
Others 9 17 
Total 54 100 
 
 
 
Table Ib. Distributor size in sample 
 
Total Number 
of Employees 
 Distributor 
Count 
50 or fewer  7 
51 to 200  20 
201 to 500  18 
501 to 1000  3 
1001 or more  7 
 
 
 
 
Table IIa. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable* Mean SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Dependence 3.26 0.46 2 4.5 0.04 3.80 
Trust 4.09 0.46 2.5 5.0 -0.75 5.06 
Ptt 3.18 0.52 2.0 4.0 -0.07 2.11 
Size 3.61 1.02 1.5 5.0 -0.46 2.14 
Length of VMI 3.91 2.56 0.5 8.0 0.29 1.96 
Length of Relation 6.82 2.19 0.5 8.0 -1.57 4.03 
Industry VMI Use 19.2 14.12 10 70 1.61 5.15 
Performance 3.62 0.72 2 5 -0.65 3.03 
       
Factors of Trust Mean sd  Factors of Dependence Mean sd 
Fairness 4.25 0.62  % of purchases 2.06 1.12 
Unfair advantage 2.30 0.92  % of VMI products 3.38 1.18 
Welfare 3.76 0.69  Supplier importance 4.50 0.80 
Keeping promises 4.05 0.68  Other suppliers 3.02 1.04 
Ability – competence 4.27 0.53     
Trustworthy reputation 4.33 0.61     
*Mean values are average of all items/measures for a dimension/factor/variable. 
 
 
Table IIb. Correlation matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Dependence – 4 items 1        
2 Trust – 6 items -0.018 1       
3 Ptt – 3 items -0.047 0.429 1      
4 Size – 2 items 0.156 0.232 0.217 1     
5 Length of VMI 0.304 -0.327 -0.238 0.160 1    
6 Length of Relation 0.148 -0.290 -0.103 0.224 0.321 1   
7 Industry VMI Use 0.378 -0.030 -0.034 0.006 0.114 0.126 1  
8 Performance 0.252 0.220 0.021 0.371 0.127 0.005 -0.032 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III. OLS regression results 
 
Variables Model-1 DV: Dependence 
Model-2 
DV: Trust 
Model-3 
DV: Trust 
Length of VMI 0.17* - - 
Length of Relation - -0.41** -0.41** 
Size -0.13 0.19 0.21 
Dependence - -0.03 2.85* 
Dependence2 - - -0.11* 
Propensity to Trust - 0.67*** 0.67*** 
Industry Auto -0.54 -1.10 -1.07 
Industry Electrical 0.57 -1.06 -1.13 
Industry VMI Use 0.04*** 0.18 0.01 
Performance 0.20* 0.01 0.14 
R2 31 % 33 % 38 % 
Adj. R2 22 % 22 % 25 % 
# observations 54 54 54 
             Significance Levels: * p< 0.10       ** p<0.05      *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table IV. Survey questionnaire 
 
Questions and Constructs 
(Unless otherwise noted: measured via five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) 
 
Literature 
 
Trust 
We receive fair treatment from this supplier.  Dyer and Chu 2000 
If given a chance, this supplier could take unfair advantage in our business relationship.  Dyer and Chu 2000 
When making important decisions, this supplier considers our firm’s welfare as well as its own.  Doney and Cannon 1997 
Based on past experience, we can rely on this supplier to keep promises made to our firm.  Zaheer et al 1998 
This supplier is competent and capable of providing us with required products according to our specifications in a timely 
fashion. 
 - 
This supplier has a reputation for trustworthiness in the business world.  Dyer&Chu 2000 
 
Dependence 
This supplier is important to our firm.  Chwelos et al 2001 
Approximately, ____________percent  of our purchases (dollar value) is from this supplier: 
(five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = less than 5%, 2 = 5% to 15%, 3 = 16% to 30%, 4 = 31% to 50%, 5 = more than 50%) 
 Chwelos et al 2001 
The replenishment of _______________ percent of the products purchased from this supplier is done through VMI. 
(five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = less than 25%, 2 = 25% to 50%, 3 = 51% to 75%, 4 = 76% to 99%, 5 = 100%) 
 - 
Approximately how many other suppliers are available in the supply market for the product(s) you purchase from this 
supplier? 
(five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = none, 2 = 1 to 2, 3 = 3 to 5, 4 = 6 to 10, 5 = more than 10) 
 
Chwelos et al 2001 
 
Performance 
Use of VMI has improved our fill rate to our customers.  - 
Use of VMI has allowed us to reduce our inventory related costs.  - 
Use of VMI has increased our inventory turnover.  - 
 
Propensity to Trust (PTT) 
Most business partners can be counted on to do what they say they will do.  Mayer and Davis 1999 
These days, our business should be alert; otherwise some other firms are likely to take advantage of us.  Mayer and Davis 1999 
In dealing with our suppliers and customers, each and every aspect of the relationship should be written in a contract to 
prevent opportunistic behavior. 
 - 
 
Length of Relationships 
(five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = less than a year, 2 = 1-2 years, 3 = 3-4 years, 4 = 5-6 years, 5 = 7 years or more) 
How long has your firm been doing business with this supplier? (Round to the nearest year)  - 
How long have you been personally involved in your firm’s relationship with this supplier?(Round to the nearest year)  - 
How long has your firm been using VMI with this supplier? (Round to the nearest year)  - 
 
Size 
How many employees does your firm have (all locations)? 
(five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = 50 or fewer, 2 = 51 to 200, 3 = 201 to 500, 4 = 501 to 1000, 5 = 1001 or more) 
 - 
Please indicate the total revenues for your firm (all locations) in 2010 (or fiscal year 2010) by selecting the appropriate 
number below. 
(five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = less than $1 million, 2 = $1 to $4.99 million, 3 = $5 to $19.99 million, 4 = $20 to $50 million, 5 = more than $50 
million) 
 
- 
 
Industry 
In what industry does your firm mainly operate? Please circle the appropriate option or, write the industry next to the 
“Other” choice. (1 = Electrical, 2 = Plumbing, 3 = Auto Parts, 4 = Health Care, 5 = Consumer Goods, 6 = Other) 
 - 
Approximately what percentage of firms in your industry uses a VMI arrangement with their suppliers? 
(five-point Likert-type scale, 1 = less than 20%, 2 = 20% to 40%, 3 = 41% to 60%, 4 = 61% to 80%, 5 = 81% to 100%) 
 - 
 
Figure 1. (a) Linear relation between dependence and length of VMI, and (b) Curvilinear 
relation between dependence and trust 
(a) 
 
(b)  
 
